Nuclearization or Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula?

For a short period prior to the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 12 March 1993 that it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), movement towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula appeared inevitable. ¹ Since the announcement, this assumption has been shown to be premature. Moreover, subsequent developments have indicated the possibility of a more disconcerting trend: the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the Northeast Asia region. While it is possible to envisage that the nuclearization of the region might create a favourable security arrangement based on deterrence, such an outcome appears very optimistic. Even assuming an alternative optimistic scenario, whereby the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons because of their security guarantees with the United States, this restraint could not be expected to remain indefinitely. A more pessimistic scenario might therefore see a ‘proliferation chain’ envelop the region. The initiation of such a nuclear arms race would undoubtedly prejudice stability in the region and critically undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime.