The Gains and Costs of Non-Lethal Warfare

The implications of the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi aggression in 1991 are somewhat confusing for the future of chemical warfare. Since the Iraqi armed forces had used such weapons, in a relatively deadly form, against the Iranians in the years between 1982 and 1988, and against their own civilians, it was widely anticipated that such weapons would be used against the United States and other armed forces marshalled for Desert Storm and Desert Shield, ¹ and also in the Scud missile attacks launched by Saddam Hussein against Israel (in his vain attempt to split the allied coalition by recasting the struggle as between the Arabs and Israel). ² But no such use of chemical weapons was made, either against the allies or against Israel, even as allied forces were storming across the Iraqi defense line south of Kuwait. ³ Analysts might thus draw the conclusion that chemical weapons were not such a promising military tool, as the allies were not deterred by their prospective military power, and as Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi commanders were unable to get them into use in face of the power and rapidity of the allied conventional attack, or afraid to use them for fear of the allied retaliation that would come. ⁴