ABSTRACT
The deepening of the deadlock and the entrenchment of the parties in their irreconcilable positions were encouraged by two developments. One was the issuance of the Tripartite Declaration, described above. Despite American explanations that they did not intend to 'freeze boundaries' and that they had 'no objection [to] peaceful exchange' of territory under the aegis of the PCC,47 the impact of the Tripartite Declaration was to undermine the faltering conciliation efforts in Geneva in that, 'It solidified the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole in its then-current form, for the thought underlying the declaration was that a negotiated settlement was not likely. '48 There was also evidence that, while the Declaration did have its intended effect of lessening fears of Israeli 'expansionism' in Jordan and in Syria, it served, for those very reasons, as a disincentive to the Arabs to pursue a negotiated political settlement. As the head of the BMEO noted in late 1950, the existence of the Tripartite Declaration 'tend[ ed] to stiffen [the Arabs'] attitude as it reduce[d] their fear oflsrael's known superiority in arms'.49
