of [Israel's] peaceful intentions'.2 Some

Following the formal submission oflsrael's draft non-aggression treaty, Dr Eytan cabled Paris with a review and clarification ofIsrael's goals and tactics at the conference. Israel's basic fear continued to be that it would be forced into US-inspired concessions to the Arabs. This had to be circumvented, and everything possible had to be done to avoid the failure of the talks being blamed on Israel. Exactly as the Commissioners had suspected, Eytan admitted that Israel had proposed the non-aggression pacts in order to create a 'political skirmish' in the early stages of the conference. The DirectorGeneral believed that this had placed Israel in a 'no-lose' situation vis-a-vis the Arabs. If the Arabs agreed to sign such a declaration, it would 'signify considerable and desirable progress in relations that would facilitate practical discussions'. If, on the other hand, the Arabs refused to sign, (a) it would mean that Israel could go before the world and the forthcoming UNGA as the 'promoter of peace' while the other side would appear as the 'obstacle to progress', and (b) it would vindicate Israel's persistent rejection of concessions which were unacceptable to the government and public opinion.4