ABSTRACT
In a previous article this author examined the British response to the revolt against Portuguese rule in Angola which began in the early months of 1961. 1 The article emphasized the dilemma of the British government, one shared by its counterpart in Washington, in seeking to reconcile the demands of the newly independent Afro-Asian countries for immediate self-government and independence for Portugal’s African territories – Angola, Mozambique, Guiné-Bissau and the islands of Príncipe and São Tomé – with the intransigent refusal of the Portuguese dictatorship of António Oliveira Salazar, essentially for reasons of self-preservation, even to recognize the case for independence, let alone implement it. This intransigence was partly resulted from of the deeply rooted psychological belief within Portugal that its own independence was closely bound to the fate of its colonies. It also partly resulted from a consequence of the fact that the country stood to lose a great deal economically, on the realistic assumption that it would be unable to neo-colonialize once the colonies were let go: the loss of economic benefits would include a significant export market and a considerable source of cheap raw materials, foodstuffs and foreign exchange earnings. Finally, it partly reflected the fact that the fate of the Salazar regime itself was inextricably linked with that of the empire. Faced by 1960 with an increasing challenge to his authority within Portugal, Salazar was able to exploit events in Africa to save himself and his regime. At the same time, it was from genuine conviction that the Portuguese argued that their colonialism was unique and that it was their declared intention to assimilate their African colonies within a greater Luso-African community. 2
