ABSTRACT
Israeli leaders were particularly sensitive to Johnson's messages, since they entertained hopes of completing the slow tilt in US policy towards Israel evident since the late 1950s. The most dramatic point of the crisis was Gamal Abdal Nasser's announcement at midnight on 22 May of the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and Israel's clarification that it regarded such an act as a casus belli, freeing it to take any measure deemed necessary to ensure the sea passage remained open. The administration was also implicitly accepting the time limit set by Israel, and was proceeding on the assumption that there was only 'a week or two' in Eshkol's words to Johnson to organize an international armada. Tensions between senior diplomats and senior military officers were not exactly unprecedented in Israeli's experience. Israeli leaders and statesmen identified weak points in the American argument and pressed these to advantage.
