is a choice of a specific institutional type or form to govern lighthouse services. For example, when the available private technology of collec-tion and exclusion is less effective than the government's enforcement powers, one should expect government support for the collection pro-cess. Likewise, when it is difficult for lighthouse operators to make credi-ble claims that they will adhere to afixedp rice schedule and not try to charge a passing shi p more, one should expect the government to perform this credibility function by specifying a fixed schedule of legal charges and punishing departures from it. The government provides a cost-effective technology that makes provision of the service possible. The institutional choice is thus not the stark one that the current debate of full private provision versus full governmental provision suggests. There may be a mixed system in which the government provides specific services that make the provision of a good economical, even if the pro-vider remains private. In some cases, those services will be above and

DOI link for is a choice of a specific institutional type or form to govern lighthouse services. For example, when the available private technology of collec-tion and exclusion is less effective than the government's enforcement powers, one should expect government support for the collection pro-cess. Likewise, when it is difficult for lighthouse operators to make credi-ble claims that they will adhere to afixedp rice schedule and not try to charge a passing shi p more, one should expect the government to perform this credibility function by specifying a fixed schedule of legal charges and punishing departures from it. The government provides a cost-effective technology that makes provision of the service possible. The institutional choice is thus not the stark one that the current debate of full private provision versus full governmental provision suggests. There may be a mixed system in which the government provides specific services that make the provision of a good economical, even if the pro-vider remains private. In some cases, those services will be above and

is a choice of a specific institutional type or form to govern lighthouse services. For example, when the available private technology of collec-tion and exclusion is less effective than the government's enforcement powers, one should expect government support for the collection pro-cess. Likewise, when it is difficult for lighthouse operators to make credi-ble claims that they will adhere to afixedp rice schedule and not try to charge a passing shi p more, one should expect the government to perform this credibility function by specifying a fixed schedule of legal charges and punishing departures from it. The government provides a cost-effective technology that makes provision of the service possible. The institutional choice is thus not the stark one that the current debate of full private provision versus full governmental provision suggests. There may be a mixed system in which the government provides specific services that make the provision of a good economical, even if the pro-vider remains private. In some cases, those services will be above and