ABSTRACT
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Economic theory acknowledges that there are times when markets do not lead spontaneously to allocative efficiency. BATOR shows that market failure occurs when the conditions for the first welfare theorem are not fulfilled, as is the case where there are indivisibilities in consumption, increasing returns to scale in production, and externalities. For him these are all reasons for state intervention.
