ABSTRACT
Aumann, Robert J. and Michael Maschler, “The Bargaining
Set for Cooperative Games” in Advances in Game Theory, edited by M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley and A.W. Tucker, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964
Binmore, K.G., “Nash Bargaining 2” in The Economics of Bargaining, edited by Ken Binmore and Partha Dasgupta, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987
Edgeworth, F.Y., Mathmatical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, London: Kegan Paul, 1881; reprinted New York: Kelley, 1967
Foldes, Lucien, “A Determinate Model of Bilateral Monopoly”, Economica, New Series, 31/122 (1964): 117-31
Harsanyi, John, “Approaches to Bargaining before and after the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories”, Econometrica, 26/2 (1956): 144-47
Kalai, Ehud and Meir Smorodinsky, “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 43/3 (May 1975): 513-18
Kalai, E., “Solutions to the Bargaining Problem” in Social Goals and Social Organization, edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985
Khilstrom, R.E., A.E. Roth and D. Schmeidler, “Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem” in Social Goals and Social Organization, edited by Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler and Hugo Sonnenschein, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985
Maschler, Michael and Micha A. Perles, “The Present Status of the Super-additive Solution” in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, edited by Robert J. Aumann et al., Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1981
Nash, John, “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 18/2 (1950): 155-62
Nash, John, “Two-Person Cooperative Games”, Econometrica, 21/1 (1953): 128-40
Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein, Bargaining and Markets, San Diego and London: Academic Press, 1990
Roth, Alvin E., Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Berlin and New York: Springer, 1979
Roth, Alvin E. (editor), Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985
Rubinstein, Ariel, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, 50/1 (1982): 97-109
Rubinstein, Ariel, “A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences”, Econometrica, 53/5 (September 1985): 1151-72
Schelling, T.C., “An Essay on Bargaining”, American Economic Review, 46/3 (1956): 281-306
Young, Oran R., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975
Zeuthen, Frederik, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 1930
EDGEWORTH initiated the pioneering formal analysis of bargaining, in the setting of bilateral monopoly. With two parties whose preferences and initial endowments are given exogenously, Edgeworth’s task was to determine the quantities exchanged, subject to the condition that such exchange be mutually beneficial. He delimited the set of “efficient” potential trades, in the sense that there could be no further mutually beneficial exchange between the parties, denoting this set the “contract curve,” and concluded that the outcome was indeterminate. The quest for a determinate solution to the bargaining problem has been a central issue addressed by successive theorists. In the analytical framework of Edgeworth, a determinate outcome for the bilateral monopoly exchange problem was developed by FOLDES, whose model incorporated costs from delay in reaching an agreement.
