ABSTRACT
George, Alexander and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974
Harvey, Frank P. and Patrick James, “Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 12 (1992): 17-45
Harvey, Frank P., “Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests: Necessity, Sufficiency, and Deterrence Logic”, International Studies Quarterly, 42/4 (1998): 675-707
Jervis, Robert, “Deterrence Theory Revisited”, World Politics, 31 (1979): 289-324
Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore, I Deter”, World Politics, 41/2 (1989): 208-24
Oneal, John R., Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982
Russett, Bruce M., “The Calculus of Deterrence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (1963): 97-109
RUSSETT’s analysis of 17 crises between 1935 and 1961 appears to be the first systematic study of deterrence. Each crisis in his data set conforms to the necessary and sufficient conditions for “extended deterrence”. “Extended deterrence” refers to cases where a major power attacker overtly threatened a pawn with military force, and where the defender had given (prior to the crisis) some indication that it would protect the pawn or where the defender made a commitment in time to prevent the threatened attack. “Successful deterrence” is defined as the prevention of an attack on the pawn without the defender’s use of military force. The most interesting results of this study are that deterrence fails in 11 out of 17 cases and, where successful, economic ties between the defender and pawn – not the balance of military forces – appear to be most important. Russett’s study is significant in setting the agenda for future work, which has focused on a wider range of variables than those connected with the standard framework of power politics.
