ABSTRACT

This chapter addresses some of the ways in which those organizations and states themselves have sought to attain better compliance with agreed norms, especially environmental norms. Assessment and persuasion by reference to accepted rules is not identical with 'enforcement', although the terms do overlap. It is widely accepted today that persuasion instead of enforcement is the appropriate cure to the malady of non–compliance. The non–compliance procedure under the Montreal Ozone Protocol enables the Implementation Committee to suggest limited measures to be taken by the Meeting of the Parties against non–complying states. Parties will have to ensure that the institutions entrusted with monitoring compliance are adequately funded. Environmentalists should be cautioned by experience in the field of human rights. More ambitious procedures exist within the International Labour Organization (ILO). Under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, complaints of non–compliance with ILO conventions are directed to a Commission of Enquiry.