ABSTRACT
The 1980s marked a time of considerable change for the British and US armies, in terms of both doctrine and equipment. The doctrinal reforms of the 1980s required a number of years to implement fully, but sufficient progress had been made towards the end of the decade that a major corps-level exercise could be held to test the new concepts. In parallel with developments in the United States, there occurred a series of changes in both the organisation and equipment of British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) and—perhaps more fundamentally—changes in doctrine. In combination, these developments resulted in a ‘new-look’ BAOR, and ultimately exercised a profound impact on the manner in which North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) intended to conduct conventional operations. Given the strictly limited resources available to NORTHAG, hard choices had to be made if sufficient troops were to be freed from forward areas in order to create a reserve of any great strength.
