ABSTRACT
Does coercion necessarily limit freedom? The natural inclination is to reply “Yes, of course,” and to support this by stating a definition of coercion: viz., getting someone to do something by threatening him with some evil. But this reply is inadequate for it is not clear why threatening someone with evil limits his freedom. Consider what I shall call enticement: 1 viz., getting someone to do something by promising him some good. Does enticement necessarily limit freedom? If we say “Yes,” then we are committed to the view that it is prima facie immoral to get someone to do anything by promising him some good. We are committed to this because it is prima facie immoral to limit anyone’s freedom, that is, there is a 31moral rule that prohibits depriving anyone of freedom. 2 If we say that enticement does not limit freedom, we must explain why threats of evil limit freedom but promises of good do not. 3 (Interestingly, no one takes the view that enticement limits freedom, but that coercion does not.)
