ABSTRACT
Socialphilosophers,lesshumanethanthescientistsquotedabove,butequallydisturbedbythe problemsoftheirsocieties,attimeshavefound the"commonmotive"themeacongenialone, andhaveusedthethreatofsocialdisintegration andindividualdegenerationtojustifymeasures forthestandardizationofsentiments. I t is,however,impossibletodemonstrateem-
piricallythatanysocialsystemisoperatedby individualsalldrivenbythesamemotives;indeed,thedataofpersonality-and-culturestudies, aswellasclinicalobservation,showconclusivelythatasharingofmotivesisnotnecessarytoasharingofinstitutions.Buthowabout asharingo£cognitions?Iscognitivesharinga functionalprerequisiteofsociety?Herewe enterthedomainoftheethnographerwhomay notwishtotreadthespongygroundofmotiveanalysis,butfindsitbothnecessaryandpainless tomakeinferencesfromovertbehaviorabout cognitivematters,suchasthecriteriafordiscriminationofkinsmenbyterminologicalcategory,thesubstantivebeliefsabouttheorderof thecosmos,andtherulesofprocedureby whichashamanarrivesathisdifferentialdiagnosisoverasickchild.Theminimumtaskof theethnographer,ofcourse,issimplytodescribeoverthumanbehavior."Description,"in thisminimumsense,istheformulationofaset ofstatementswhichwillpredict,fortheethnographer,whataclassofsubjectswilldoandsay undervariouscircumstances.Accordingly,any completeethnographicstatementwillinclude aspecificationofbothaconfigurationofcircumstancesandofabehaviorsequencewhicha classofsubjectsproduces(presumptivelyasa resultoflearning)wheneverthatconfiguration presentsitself.Usually,the"circumstances" whichelicitacertainbehaviorsequenceonthe partofoneclassofsubjectswillincludethe actsandutterancesofanotherclassofsub-
jects.Therefore,mostethnographicdescriptions primarilyconcernrepetitivepatternsofreciprocalinteractioninwhichthebehaviorsof eachclassofsubjectsarethecircumstancefor thebehaviorsoftheotherclassofsubjects. I t hasbeensometimesassumedthatsuch
systemsofreciprocalinteraction,inwhichdifferentclassesofsubjectsplayspecializedroles,as wellasgeneralnormsdescribingconstantactand-circumstancerelationsforasingleclassof subjects,requirenotmerelyasetofcognitive maps,butauniformityofcognitivemaps amongtheparticipantsfortheircontinuedsuccessfuloperation.Thus,forexample,intheir previouslyquotedessayonthefunctionalprerequisitesofahumansociety,Aberle,Cohen, Davis,Levy,andSuttonpostulatethenecessity of"sharedcognitiveorientations,"aswellas "shared,articulatedsetofgoals."Yetwhatfew formalattemptshavebeenmade,bytechniques suchascomponentialanalysis,todefinethecognitivemapsnecessarytoculturallycorrectbehaviorshavedemonstratedunambiguouslythat itisoftenpossiblefortheethnographertoconstructseveraldifferentmaps,eachoneofwhich willpredictadequatelytheovertbehaviorof subjects.Letusthereforenowaskthequestion directly:Isitnecessarythatallparticipantsin astablesocio-culturalsystemhavethesame "map"ofthesysteminorderthattheymay selectthecorrectovertbehaviorsunderthe variousrelevantcircumstances?
