ABSTRACT
IT will be inferred from what has been said that the theory which transformed the Roman jurisprudence had no claim to philosophical precision. It involved, in fact, one of those " mixed modes of thought" which are now acknowledged to have characterised all but the highest minds during the infancy of speculation, and which are far from undiscoverable even in the mental efforts of our own day. The Law of Nature confused the Past and the Present. Logically, it implied a state of Nature which had once been regulated by natural law; yet the jurisconsults do not speak clearly or confidently of the existence of such a state, which indeed is little noticed by the ancients except where it finds a poetical expression in the fancy of a golden age. Natural law, for all practical purposes, was something belonging to the present, something entwined with existing institutions, something which could be distinguished from them by a competent observer. The test which separated the ordinances of Nature
fromthegrossingredientswithwhichtheyweremino gledwasasenseofsimplicityandharmony;yetit wasnotonaccountoftheirsimplicityandharmony thatthesefinerelementswereprimarilyrespected,but onthescoreoftheirdescentfromtheaboriginalreign ofNature.Thisconfusionhasnotbeensuccessfully explainedawaybythemoderndisciplesofthejurisconsults,andintruthmodernspeculationsonthe LawofNature.betraymuchmoreindistinctnessof perceptionandarevitiatedbymuchmorehopeless ambiguityoflanguagethantheRomanlawyerscan bejustlychargedwith.Therearesomewriterson thesubjectwhoattempttoevadethefundamental difficultyby'contendingthatthecodeofNature existsinthefutureandisthegoaltowhichallcivil lawsaremoving,butthisistoreversetheassumptionsonwhichtheoldtheoryrested,orrather perhapstomixtogethertwoinconsistenttheories. Thetendencytolooknottothepastbuttothefuture fortypesofperfectionwasbroughtintotheworld byChristianity.Ancientliteraturegivesfewor nohintsofabeliefthattheprogressofsocietyis necessarilyfromworsetobetter.
