ABSTRACT
THEREarefewgeneralpropositionsconcerningthe agetowhichwebelongwhichseematfirstsight likelytobereceivedwithreadierconcurrence thantheassertionthatthesocietyofourdayis mainlydistinguishedfromthatofprecedinggenerationsbythelargenessofthespherewhichis occupiedinitbyContract.Someofthephenomena onwhichthispropositionrestsareamongthose mostfrequentlysingledoutfornotice,forcomment, andforeulogy.Notmanyofusaresounobservant asnottoperceivethatininnumerablecaseswhereold lawfixedaman'ssocialpositionirreversiblyathis birth,modernlawallowshimtocreateitforhimselfby convention;andindeedseveralofthefewexceptions whichremaintothisruleareconstantlydenounced withpassionateindignation.Thepoint,forinstance, whichisreallydebatedinthevigorouscontroversy stillcarriedonuponthesubjectofnegroservitude, iswhetherthestatusoftheslavedoesnotbelong toby-goneinstitutions,andwhethertheonlyrelation betweenemployerandlabourerwhichcommends
itself to modern morality be not a relation determined exclusively by contract. The recognition of this difference between past ages and the present enters into the very essence of the most famous contemporary speculations. It is certain that the science of Political Economy, the only department of moral inquiry which has made any considerable progress in our day, would fail to correspond with the facts of life if it were not true that Imperative Law had abandoned the ln.rgest part of the field which it once occupied, and had left men to settle rules of conduct for themselves with a liberty never allowed to them till recently. The bias indeed of most persons trained in political economy is to consider the general truth on which their science reposes as entitled to become universal, and, when they apply it as an art, their efforts are ordinarily directed to enlarging the province of Contract and to curtailing that of Imperative Law, except so far as law is necessary to enforce the performance of Contracts. The impulse given by thinkers who are under the influence of these ideas is beginning to be very strongly felt in the Western world. Legislation has nearly confessed its inability to keep pace with the activity of man in discovery, in invention, and in the manipulation of accumulated wealth; and the law even of the least advanced communities tends more and more to become a mere surface··stratum, having
Social inquiries, so far as they depend on the consideration of legal phenomena, are in so backward a condition that we need not be surprised at not finding these truths recognised in the commonplaces which pass current concerning the progress of society. These commonplaces answer much more to our prejudices than to our convictions. The strong disinclination of most men to regard morality as advancing seems to be especially powerful when the virtues on which Contract depends are in question, and many of us have an almost instinctive reluctance to admitting that good faith and trust in our fellows are more widely diffused than of old, or that there is anything in contemporary manners which parallels the loyalty of the antique world. From time to time, these prepossessions are greatly strengthened by the spectacle of frauds, unheard of before the perio<.l at which they were observed, and astonishing from their complication as well as shocking from criminality. But the very character of these frauds shows clearly that, before they became possible, the moral obligations of which they are the breach must have been more than proportionately developed. It
is the confidence reposed and deserved by the many which affords facilities for the bad faith of the few, so that, if colossal examples of dishonesty occur, there is no surer conclusion than that scrupulous honesty is displayed in the average Qf the transactions which, in the particular case, have supplied the deli~quent with his opportunity. If we insist on reading the history of morality as reflected in jurisprudence, by turning our eyes not on the law of Contract but on the law of Crime, we must be careful that we read it aright. The only form of dishonesty treated of in the most ancient Roman law is Theft. At the moment at which I write, the newest chapter in the English criminal law is one which attempts to prescribe punishment for the frauds of Trustees. The proper inference from this contrast is not that the primitive Romans practised a higher morality than ourselves. We should rather say that, in the interval between their days and ours, morality has advanced from a very rude to a highly refined conception-from viewing the rights of property as exclusively sacred, to looking upon the rights growing out of the mere unilateral reposal of confidence as entitled to the protection of the penal law.
