ABSTRACT
Before juvenile courts, children in trouble with the law could be handled according to the Common Law Principle of Responsibility. The common law principle specified three categories of youth that were differentiated by age and an associated presumption of criminal intent. Specifically, children under the age of seven were presumed incapable of harboring criminal intent and were not to be subject to criminal sanctions. Children be tween the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed possibly capable of harboring criminal intent and could be subject to criminal sanctions. Youth aged fourteen and older were presumed definitely capable of harboring criminal intent and were to be subject to criminal sanctions. As a result of the possibility that children aged seven or older could be subject to adult-like criminal sanctions, including the death penalty, the development of the juvenile court was commonly hailed as a major benevolent reform that spared children from the harsh punishments meted out to adult criminals (Mennel, 1973). However, historical evidence suggests children were largely spared from adult-like punishments before the creation of the juvenile courts.
