ABSTRACT
The proliferation of so-called "strict liability" offenses in the criminal law has occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and philosophers of the law. The imposition of severe criminal sanctions in the absence of any requisite mental'element has been held by many to be incompatible with the basic requirements of our Anglo-American, and, indeed, any civilized jurisprudence. Neither the arguments against the imposition of strict criminal liability nor the justifications for such imposition can be evaluated intelligently until the meaning of the phrase "strict criminal liability" has been clarified. As an empirical assertion the protest against strict liability on the grounds that it contravenes public sentiment is, again, at best an open hypothesis. Strict liability offenses, as the critics so persistently note, are not mere sports, mere sporadic legislative oversights or anomalies. Strict liability offenses can be interpreted as legislative judgments that persons who intentionally engage in certain activities.
