ABSTRACT
The politics—administration dichotomy is a social construct. During the twentieth century, the dichotomy has been codified in laws and regulations, upheld by court rulings, internalized by public officials, and presupposed in much scholarly work. A good way to characterize the politics—administration dichotomy is to follow current fashions in Public Administration and Political Science and call it an institution. In the power game between politicians and public servants, the dichotomy may serve as a rhetorical tool or hiding cloak to either party—or indeed to both parties simultaneously. The dichotomy-as-constitutional-principle assumes that out of sheer power hunger or for nobler aims, politicians and administrators will always be tempted to encroach on each other's territory. Constitutionalism itself implies that the constitutionalist rationale for the dichotomy transcends and overrides the bureaucratic and democratic rationales. Recognizing the politics—administration dichotomy as a constitutional principle might further serve to remove a blind spot of constitutional theorists from fields of Law and Political Science.
