ABSTRACT
In 1994, the posthumous publication of Hart's Postscript appeared to offer hope for a resolution to the longstanding Hart—Ronald Dworkin debate. Yet no such resolution has emerged. This chapter suggests that Hart's theory of the concept of law is properly understood as serving a special philosophical purpose and is not merely the piece of 'general jurisprudence' that it is often thought to be. However incompletely or awkwardly expressed in his writing, Hart's philosophical purpose is to contribute one step forward to a broad and general understanding of social life. The chapter demonstrates how Hart's relational account eludes the practicality, comprehensive normativity, and univocity demands. The relational account of the concept of law aims to serve general, philosophical purposes, and consequently it does not require confirmation by practical success. Talk of vagueness makes philosophers unnecessarily nervous — unnecessarily because acceptance of the vagueness of a concept is compatible with recognition of a central or core meaning of a concept.
