ABSTRACT
In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. This chapter explains why Ronald Dworkin was wrong to think that Herbert L. A. Hart and others were concerned with the meaning of the word "law". It explains some mistakes that may have led Dworkin to endorse his third thesis about the nature of legal philosophy, namely the thesis that jurisprudence is a silent prologue to any legal decision. Criterial explanations are explanations in terms of rules setting criteria for the correct use of concepts, or words—and there is nothing individualistic in that—which are the correct rules if they are shared by the linguistic community. There is a difference of some importance between "ordinary" and theoretical criterial explanations. "Ordinary" explanations are vague, partly because they explain vague concepts and partly because they are incomplete. Theoretical explanations also are incomplete, but they aim to be relatively complete.
