ABSTRACT
The great defect, and tragedy, in the International Law Commission's recommendations about the interpretation of treaties is in their insistent emphasis upon an impossible, conformity-imposing textuality. In justifying the inclusion within its draft articles of any principles of interpretation—principles whose "utility and even existence" have been "sometimes questioned"—the Commission makes a distinction between "so-called canons" and "general rules" of interpretation. The framework of particular principles which the Commission in fact projects into its draft articles begins with that inevitable twin of textuality: "ordinary meaning". The Commentary makes clear that "object and purpose" do not refer to the actual subjectivities of the parties, rejected as the goal of interpretation, but rather to the mere words about "object and purpose" intrinsic to the text. The Commission explicitly refuses to recognize the principle of "effectiveness" by which decision-makers traditionally have assessed the relevance of many varying indices of the parties' shared purposes.
