ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by examining the institutional factors in the late 1980s which made it possible for the reformists to pursue institutional compromise. It explains that the Hungarian reform Communists were more popular than their counterparts in Poland. The chapter describes that, while the Polish rulers acted rationally in demanding certain guarantees, when negotiating with the opposition they were not rational in their choice of majoritarian over proportional elections for the freely contested seats. It examines that the Hungarian rulers behaved highly strategically, although their Polish comrades were relatively more strategic than the East German and Czechoslovak leaders. The chapter explains that the radicals in both Poland and Hungary were clearly democrats from the beginning. It discusses the analysis of Polish rulers' institutional interests, especially their pragmatic acceptance. The chapter looks at how the regime and opposition prepared for the negotiations. It describes the reasons why the Polish rulers did not behave as strategically as Adam Przeworski expects.
