ABSTRACT

This chapter emphasizes the general structural conditions for the collapse. It focuses on regime policy before 1988. The chapter looks at the general atmosphere in the East European societies. It describes the pragmatic manner in which the regimes tried to gain the acceptance of the population after Soviet invasions or threats of invasions. The chapter examines the regimes' actual policies in light of their different modes of pragmatic acceptance. It shows that the Soviet leader did not encourage reforms in the Ceskoslovenska socialisticka republika. The Soviet Politburo tried, accordingly, to convince the Polish leaders to drop Gomulka and to maintain hardliners at their posts. Thus, as Gomulka in 1956, Jaruzelski came to power during a period in which there was widespread fear of a Soviet invasion. The chapter concludes that the Polish and Hungarian regimes had reformist policy legacies that gave them some room for flexibility.