ABSTRACT
This chapter explains Arthur Ripstein's view that tort law, for Rawls, is an independent corrective justice module that swings clear of the two principles of justice and will defend the thesis against Ripstein's claims. It presents Stephen Perry's argument that, even though Rawls adopts a maximizing distributive scheme, corrective justice finds an "independent" place within that scheme. The Rawlsian view of property is inconsistent with a principled basis for holding the corrective justice view, and incompatible with the "conceptual space" required for corrective justice to operate even if this view were so held. The chapter discusses the relationship between tort law and Rawls's first principle of justice. It explains the function of tort law in the post-institutional Rawlsian distributive scheme. In non-ideal theory, more actions out of compliance with the demands of justice would be committed, and a Rawlsian might adopt legal and political institutions other than those that might be adopted with the assumption of strict compliance in place.
