ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the so-called separation of law and morals, and its place in legal theory. The separation thesis is regarded as a dividing line in legal theory: legal positivists are supposed to accept it and natural lawyers to reject it. Those who accept it seem to regard it as an important truism, neglect of which invites both moral and theoretical confusion. The Minimal Separation Thesis appears to be the basic doctrine that H. L. A. Hart defends, and it is one that most partisans of the separation thesis would, the author think, acknowledge as their own. The first point that needs to be made is that the Minimal Thesis fails to distinguish legal positivism from natural law. The Expanded Thesis tries to make the point that something can be law even though it does not meet moral conditions. This is meant as a point about law in general, not about the law of a particular system.
