ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that Immanuel Kant's legal principles contain two distinct grounds of obligation to obey political authority. One lies in his metaphysical principles of law, according to which there is only a duty to obey legitimate law or fully legitimate authorities. Another lies in his moral-pragmatic principles. The chapter also argues that the apparent ambiguities in Kant's treatment of obedience and resistance point to some crucial shortcomings of Kant's views on the division of governmental powers and on judicial competence. It then considers some of Kant's Reflexionen that suggest a remedy for the defect. The chapter contains the tension mentioned at the outset between Kant's criterion of the legitimacy of law and his defense of the absolute obligation to obey established authority, along with Kant's strict qualification of the duty to obey the law. Kant's argument against the right of revolution in "Theory and Practice" is the model for the argument he offers later in MEJ.
