ABSTRACT
This chapter highlights features of Immanuel Kant's conception of wrongdoing that imply that wrongdoers are necessarily liable to suffer because of their wrongdoing. It explains the utilitarian's position here is directly opposed to Kant's. The chapter argues that, despite appearances to the contrary, systematic work Kant does not rely on the intrinsic desert thesis as a basic action-guiding principle. It reviews some basic elements of Kant's conception of wrongdoing and then draws out their implications. Suffering from self-blame is to be expected, and it is not altogether to be deplored because it is beneficial if it leads to reform and restored relations. Kant adds, 'a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy'. Kant presents his most thorough and systematic statement on punishment in The Metaphysics of Morals. The chapter concludes with a few brief conjectures about the implications of Kant's basic ideas as presented for further development of a Kantian theory of punishment.
