ABSTRACT
In both the academic debate as well as in Chinese politics urban–rural difference is a frequently used categorisation. Policies addressing previous neglect of rural China have been the official top-priority of China’s current leadership since it came to power in 2003—2004. This article argues that we need to nuance the distinct dichotomy between urban and rural, and look into the specifics of how differences are actively mobilised when claims are made. The article builds on extensive fieldwork on the claims made by land-losing peasants and local political leaders on the urban—rural boundary in one of the front posts of the current regime’s refocus on rural development, Chengdu, appointed as an experimental zone of Urban—Rural Integration (cheng-xiang yitihua) along with Chongqing in 2007 and, as a result of this, subject to massive restructuring of land use. Instead of a clear-cut urban—rural boundary that would have the potential to split the country in two, I find a much more finely masked form of differentiation based on where people are from. Both local leaders and citizens in each locality may bend and interpret rules and regulations considerably as long as their claims do not go beyond their locality.
