ABSTRACT
As we would expect from the variety of problems which it is intended to solve, Hegel's Logic is a puzzlingly complex and grandiose construction. There are two versions of the Logic. The first and fuller version, the Science of Logic, was published in two parts, the first, the 'Objective Logic', in 1812, the second, the Subjective Logic', in 1816. The contents of the Objective Logic are in their broad outlines familiar enough. The Subjective Logic, by contrast, opens with a discussion of the traditional concerns of formal logic, of concepts, judgments and forms of inference. By Hegel's account, logic is close to being an example of what Kant called an 'intuitive understanding' or 'intellectual intuition'. A partial analogue of what Hegel is attempting to do is, as we have seen, a formal system such as arithmetic or Russellian logic in which symbols are defined in terms of other symbols chosen as primitives.
