ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with a brief survey of state-imposed disqualifications and argues those certain basic rights and interests—such as those of liberty, or of access to the more commonplace sorts of employment—should not be subject to civil disqualifications. It offers a conception of how disqualifications should be dealt with, rather than a doctrine that purports to account for existing law. The risk of over-broad restriction is all the greater because disqualifications often are adopted piecemeal and tend to cumulate: securities regulators want to exclude ex-offenders from the securities industry; plumbers want a similar exclusion for ex-offenders as plumbers, and so forth. Disqualifications deprive offenders of certain interests that they would otherwise have while living in the community, such as holding a particular job or driving a car. The comprehensive driving ban just discussed is, of course, an extreme version of using disqualifications as penalties: the ban is to be imposed on those whose crimes have nothing to do with driving.
