ABSTRACT
Majoritarianism and egalitarianism are surely both ancient American ideals; indeed, dictionary definitions of "democracy" tend to incorporate both thoughts. This chapter comprises three arguments in favor of a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review. The first will take longer than the others since it will necessitate a tour, albeit brisk, of the Constitution itself. The other two arguments are susceptible to briefer statement but are not for that reason less important. The first is that a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its rival value-protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American system of representative democracy. The second is that such an approach, again in contradistinction to its rival, involves tasks that courts, as experts on process and as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to perform than political officials.
