ABSTRACT
This chapter takes up the problem of moral failure, especially through a phenomenological lens. In reflecting on my experiences of failure in parenting, I explain the reasons why I have found it both difficult and necessary to claim my moral failure as such, rather than allowing myself and others to re-describe it to lessen its painful burden. I argue that moral failure must be acknowledged for what it is so that we are able to appropriately grieve it and encompass it, using Noddings’ conception of the ideal caring self as a model because it is dynamic and allows for these kinds of change. Using Tessman’s discussion of moral failure as a matter of moral dilemma, I argue that another reason moral failure must be acknowledged is that it is a reality in the lives of many people, especially those who live in circumstances of significant constraint, such as poverty and/or oppression. I use the literature on nursing ethics to draw out the concept of moral distress as a useful term for the felt experience of moral failure, and to point to the dangers of moral failure for people who are likely to fail frequently due to oppression, etc. I end by agreeing with Lachs’ claim that we must cultivate a reasonable sense of “good enough” to help avoid at least some of the traps of moral failure.
