ABSTRACT
The image of the Great Powers of Europe carving up territory for their respective empires is an appealing one, evoking popular satirical cartoons depicting representatives of the Great Powers posed with knives and forks preparing to dissect a map of the world. Recent historiography of the First Anglo-Afghan War has reflected these images, seeking to present the British in caricature, as fumbling bumbling incompetent idiots incapable of rational thought, hell-bent on personal gain and imperial expansion, and fearful of a distant Russian menace, which, at any moment, might descend in hordes upon India, throwing the British out of the subcontinent. Indeed, the majority of work on Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century has sought to frame it within the context of Great Power rivalry, specifically that between Britain and Russia: the so-called Great Game. That there was among the British political and military class a fear of Russian expansionism cannot be denied, but the degree to which it was the primary cause of the invasion of Afghanistan can be questioned. It is easy to conclude that Britain blundered into a costly invasion and occupation of Afghanistan if one maintains three assumptions: namely, that the British were incompetent, there was no overall strategy and there was a genuine belief that Russia posed a threat to British India. Setting aside these assumptions, it is not so easy to make such a judgement. Alternative explanations are therefore required. In fact, there were at least three views of British Indian affairs in the late 1830s: the view from London, the view from Lahore and the view from Calcutta. While they influenced each other, they should be considered separately. Moreover, these views were based on the information, framed within a pre-existing knowledge context, that London, Lahore and Calcutta had at its disposal. Drawn from different sources, each centre had different information at its disposal, which further complicated the analysis conducted at each location.
