ABSTRACT
One may hold that any one of several things related to morality and ethics is constructed, among them: normative truth itself, entitlement to one’s commitments to normative principles and judgments, and their semantic content. Metaethical constructivism, as it has been debated in moral philosophy, is largely concerned with the first of these. John Rawls’s Kantian constructivism explains moral truth in terms of what rational agents would legislate or endorse under idealized conditions. Rawls’s Kantian constructivism, therefore, involves an account of moral truth and an account of rational entitlement in that domain. While accounts of constructivism are often rejected by Christians, such views are not foreign to religious and theological ethics. Hegelian constructivism offers a way of understanding the grounds for such dissatisfaction and change while rejecting the view that consensus about such matters is the measure of their goodness, rightness, or truth.
