ABSTRACT
Chapter 5 seeks to examine the foreign policy implications of the dispute, building on the previous chapters, but moving on to adopt a more normative focus. Several potential avenues are discussed for each key stakeholder. For China the most obvious course of action is to improve the sustainability of delaying. However, this necessitates that Beijing somewhat de-escalates its conduct over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (primarily its physical presence) and that it is more active in crisis management negotiations. China can also use the time gained through delaying to pursue further military build-up to increase the feasibility of various military power based options. Alternatively, China can use this time to re-examine the underlining factors behind its more assertive policies in an attempt to break the competitive dynamic with Japan. For Japan there are two key avenues: (a) Japan can pursue a policy of direct deterrence, which would be effective in countering China’s assertive policies in the short term. However, this is likely to lead to further escalation in tensions in the future. (b) Tokyo can seek to engage China in an attempt to break the competitive dynamic, but this would require the Abe Administration to alter some its current policy positions. Finally, the United States can choose to either pursue a policy of direct deterrence or to empower its allies to take over some responsibilities. The former is based on President Obama’s pivot to Asia. While it is an effective counter to China in the short term, just as in the case of Japan, it is likely to exacerbate the situation in the long run. Alternatively, Washington could stand back and adopt a supporting role, in order to push regional allies to take a more active role. While this would allow the United States to reduce some of the burden posed by its extensive security commitments, it would require Washington to trust key regional allies (primarily Japan) that they are able and willing to step up their security policy to preserve the status quo.
