ABSTRACT

This chapter examines an epistemological disjunctivist treatment of self-knowledge of belief. More specifically, it considers whether such a Disjunctivism is confronted by a familiar objection facing Disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge. The objection is this: given that good and bad cases are subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot take oneself to be in the good case, when one is, by reflection alone, as Disjunctivists claim. Some philosophers have argued that the objection does not apply to the case of self-knowledge; I argue they are wrong. There are “ringers” for belief, and their existence may undermine our claims to self-knowledge, even in good cases. I suggest that whether the objection applies to the case of self-knowledge depends on how we conceive of conscious judgment. I end by considering an alternative conception that rules out the possibility of bad cases for self-knowledge.