ABSTRACT

The notion of "implicit agreement" will be programmatically compared to a policy for the study of "achieved agreement" which was developed from Harvey Sacks's lectures and research notes on the subject of agreement. Phillips's account of agreement confuses agreement as an interactional accomplishment with attributed sources of socially structured action. What is here at issue is a difference between "agreement" as a noticed similarity in the actions of two or more persons and "agreement" as an action which two or more persons can do together in specific interactive situations. Where issue will be taken is on the matter of how Phillips's account employs "agreement" as a device for asserting a theoretical correspondence between, for example, individual action and social action. The difference will be that the constructive-analytic work of "achieved agreement" is identified with parties' work of doing conversation, whereas in the work of finding "implicit agreement" there is no clear-cut requirement for a local visibility for such agreements.