ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that critical and propaedeutic task to Kantian aesthetics by showing that the semantic and metaphysical considerations weighing against internalism and objectivism can be met, at least enough so that internal objectivism cannot be ruled out from the start. If aesthetics asks first-order questions about what makes objects beautiful, meta-aesthetics raises second-order concerns about the significance and conditions for the possibility of such judgments about beauty. The chapter deals with articulating four logically different positions Immanuel Kant can be argued to hold concerning the nature and meaning of aesthetic judgment. It describes endorse the alternative that has been almost entirely neglected. An empirical judgment could occur prior to and independently of any particular feeling that would then follow as its result. Combining externalism and subjectivism entails that the feeling of pleasure is logically distinct from the judgment itself and the referent of the judgment is a subjective, mental condition.
