ABSTRACT
This chapter presents T. C. Schelling's vision of game theory and his main methodological innovations with respect to his account of strategic interdependence. It discusses the models of residential segregation and how, as the precursor of the agent-based modeling (ABM), they provide a promising tool to account for Schelling's conception of interdependence. The chapter reveals the social ontology underlying Schelling's work. It describes how Schelling challenges methodological individualism in game theory – at least in its strong version. Stressing Schelling's social ontology helps to clarify why he challenges the orthodoxy within economics. Besides, investigating Schelling's epistemology through social ontology can be very useful for the ongoing questioning of methodologists or philosophers of game theory. Schelling resorts to concepts – aside that of interdependence – like stability (i.e. stable pattern of behaviors), traditions, emergence, feedback, value systems, social role, etc. which are some of the fundaments of social reality. Some of the underpinnings of his work are topics that clearly refer to social ontology.
