ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces eliminativism, focusing on Churchland's account of the nature of understanding. It argues that Churchland's account is too restrictive and that understanding is often an extended mental state. The chapter also introduces introduce mental fictionalism. It shows how fictionalism allows philosophers of science to respond to the threat of eliminativism. The eliminativist claims that folk psychology is a bad theory of mind and cognition. A key feature of folk psychology is the attribution of propositional attitudes. According to the fictionalist, folk psychological states like beliefs and desires are useful fictions. The chapter focuses on how fictionalism helps to respond to the eliminativist's challenge to epistemology and philosophy of science. Fictionalism suggests an alternative path. While the eliminativist claims that folk psychology is a bad theory, the fictionalist denies that the folk were trying to give a theory of mind and cognition in the first place.
