ABSTRACT
Introduction I t is the purpose of this section to give my reaction at this writing to some of the objections and questions which have been raised at the talks I have given on the subject of this book. The subjects of the questions are listed below:
1. The calculated “costs” for a Credible First Strike are unacceptable. 2. We will not accept the possibility of uncalculable risks. 3. The program does not cover an interesting range of situations. 4. It is dangerous to dispel current illusions. 5. There are better alternatives. 6. The Preattack Mobilization Base is politically infeasible. 7. The U.S. will not survive the postwar competition. 8. Morale problems will make reconstruction impossible. 9. Counterforce as Insurance or Credible First Strike accentuates
crisis. 10. Credible First Strike increases probability of surprise attack. 11. Credible First Strike is warlike and provokes S.U. 12. Credible First Strike converts peripheral war into central war. 13. Addresses the wrong problems. 14. Evacuation means war. 15. People will not accept the government’s leadership. 16. An S.U. ultimatum ruins us. 17. The enemy can double-cross us. 18. System gives S.U. strategic warning. 19. The system leaves out world-wide claims on recuperation. 20. Undisciplined populations cannot evacuate. 21. Advance planning is useless. 22. Shelters are psychologically unsound. 23. Civil Defense causes an Arms Race.
