ABSTRACT
A good deal of material on philosophical issues related to behaviorism, operant conditioning, historicism, and the many "isms" that inhabit social science mansions, have also not found their way into the volume. Thus, the essays in the periodical literature on the philosophy of science are not adequately represented. Similarly, the philosophical studies from the social science literature are likewise inadequately accounted for. It would be valuable to have a sequel volume that focuses on philosophic problems arising out of social science findings, as well as an examination of the way in which social science reproduces classical philosophic rifts. And few people are better equipped for such an undertaking than the editor of Philosophy of the Social Sciences. The essays of Schutz, Hempel, Lavine, Nagel, Goldstein, and Natanson himself make for an extremely illuminating examination of this often neglected theme in the relationship of objectivity to subjectivity in the social sciences.
