ABSTRACT
Tamar Szabo Gendler suggests that alongside beliefs there is a mental state called "aliefs" that can motivate an individual's behavior. This chapter shows that if "aliefs" appropriately refer to a kind of mental state, then it becomes an especially noteworthy category in moral situations. The case for accepting the alief/belief distinction is one of "serviceability". An alief is a mental state with an associatively linked content that is representational, affective, and motivational, and it is activated—consciously or unconsciously—by a person's internal or ambient environment. Cares, are held not only cognitively, but also affectively and volitionally. Caring can easily be distinguished from wanting, liking, or valuing something because "the outlook of a person who cares about something is inherently prospective". The chapter argues that an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for the behavior that emanates from her aliefs and cares.
