ABSTRACT
The words of the Fourteenth Amendment do not, as Professor Crosskey argues, plainly impose the same limits upon the states as those imposed upon the United States by the first eight Amendments, nor does the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly show, as Mr. Justice Black argues, an intention to impose such limits. Frankfurter speaks of “just-minded” and “right-minded” men. In 1942, dissenting from the Court’s strict enforcement of the contractual obligations of the Government on the grounds, pressed by the Government, that the contractor had taken advantage of the desperate public need for ships to equip the Navy in World War I, Frankfurter asserted, “The law is not so primitive that it sanctions every injustice except brute force and downright fraud.” One might sensibly argue, for example, that the natural law is more nearly approximated by legislative choice or by historical accretion than by the decision of judges.
