ABSTRACT
Like most commands of our Constitution, the religion clauses of the first amendment are not statements of abstract principles. History, not logic, explains their inclusion in the Bill of Rights; necessity, not merely morality, justifies their presence there. Religious toleration, summed up in the second of the two clauses, was, therefore, necessary to preserve the peace. Separation, represented by the first of the two clauses, was necessary to make such religious freedom a reality. The objectives of the provisions were clear, but the means of their attainment were still to be developed and, indeed, are still in the course of development. Thus, like the other great clauses of Constitution, religion clauses cannot now be confined to the application they might have received in 1789. The utilization or application of these clauses in conjunction is difficult. If the command is that inhibitions not be placed by the state on religious activity, it is equally forbidden for the state to confer favours.
