ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at the specific formulations wherein Max Weber connects rationalization with repressiveness. It examines other portions of his work that express a contrary argument. The chapter presents some considerations that bear on a general assessment of Weber's position. Weber's pessimistic utterances regarding the effects of rationalization on freedom had reference specifically to the possibilities for "individually differentiated conduct" under conditions of extensive formally rational regulation of conduct. In Weber's work, the normative treatment of rationality and freedom is not always distinguished clearly from their empirical examination nor is it articulated adequately in its own right. With increasing subjective rationality, in other words, Weber associates an increase in the actor's subjective freedom of choice. Weber expressed himself on this issue in his two 1905 essays on the logic of the cultural sciences. Beyond the more adequate comprehension of Weber's stated views on rationality and freedom to be gained through the sort of critical exegesis.
