ABSTRACT
The general predisposition of scholars to be fascinated with the prospect of constructing a framework that can predict Soviet foreign policy stems largely from the fact that basic Soviet motives, purposes, and intentions are constantly articulated and expressed in speeches, documents, pronouncements, resolutions, books, laws, and articles. A comprehensive and usable framework for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy, should be sufficiently elastic and plastic can be quickly and appropriately reshaped to adjust and accommodate to new realities, data, fortuities, and situations, which themselves are unpredictable. The variables, defined as inputs or factors, whether domestic or external, that condition, shape, or animate Soviet foreign policy can be classified into five groups of gross variables, as follows: motivations/purposes/intentions; capabilities/power; risks; costs/benefits; and opportunities. The experience has shown that predicting Soviet foreign policy on the basis of Soviet capabilities can be as unreliable as predicting Soviet behavior purely on the basis of stated intentions and purposes.
