ABSTRACT
The argument that Soviet leaders are averse to taking risks and incurring costs makes it difficult to identify what they see as an opportunity. More important, it raises fundamental questions about measuring the aims of Soviet foreign policy. Although estimating Soviet perceptions and aims is difficult, it is done quite frequently. Claims about motives are usually the core ideas in competing theories about Soviet international behavior. In the United States, three dominant theories assume the following: that the Soviet Union is motivated by a determination to spread communism; that Moscow seeks to expand its influence by exploiting opportunities while protecting its security; and that the USSR is primarily committed to self-defense. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau have found that among Americans who are highly attentive to foreign policy three distinct and mutually exclusive "belief systems" are common. Integral to each is an image of the USSR. The author have labeled them communist expansionism, realpolitik expansionism, and realpolitik self-defense.
