ABSTRACT
The Intelligence Community performed much "stocktaking" in the aftermath of the Cold War as overall intelligence activities declined and changed focus. Events of the day shaped perceptions of changing intelligence objectives and of evolving obstacles to effective intelligence. Within this stocktaking, Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey became concerned that the Community must be vigilant against denial and deception challenges posed by the "snakes in the grass" that had become the primary targets of our intelligence collection and analysis. The identification of a deception operation also can affect judgments on what information might be denied, what information to seek, and how to interpret it. Recognizing a foreign denial and deception (D&D) operation can require considerable data about the data. Among the most useful types of characterizations of data is information pertaining to the potential perpetrator of a D&D operation. Although the identification of foreign D&D is critical, another important counter-D&D method is to reduce susceptibilities to potential foreign D&D.
